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The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) involves probabilistic learning via monetary rewards and
punishments, where advantageous task performance requires subjects to forego potential
large immediate rewards for small longer-term rewards to avoid larger losses. Pathological
gamblers (PG) perform worse on the IGT compared to controls, relating to their persistent
preference toward high, immediate, and uncertain rewards despite experiencing larger
losses. In this contribution, we review studies that investigated processes associated
with poor IGT performance in PG. Findings from these studies seem to fit with recent
neurocognitive models of addiction, which argue that the diminished ability of addicted
individuals to ponder short-term against long-term consequences of a choice may be
the product of an hyperactive automatic attentional and memory system for signaling
the presence of addiction-related cues (e.g., high uncertain rewards associated with
disadvantageous decks selection during the IGT) and for attributing to such cues pleasure
and excitement. This incentive-salience associated with gambling-related choice in PG
may be so high that it could literally “hijack” resources [“hot” executive functions (EFs)]
involved in emotional self-regulation and necessary to allow the enactment of further
elaborate decontextualized problem-solving abilities (“cool” EFs). A framework for future
research is also proposed, which highlights the need for studies examining how these
processes contribute specifically to the aberrant choice profile displayed by PG on the IGT.
Keywords: gambling disorder, Iowa Gambling Task, decision-making, dual-process model, willpower
INTRODUCTION
Gambling, defined as an activity in which something of value is
risked on the outcome of an event when the probability of win-
ning or losing is less than certain (Korn and Shaffer, 1999), is
a very popular recreational activity. Between 50 and 80% of the
general population gamble at least one time per year (e.g., Abbott
and Volberg, 1995; Welte et al., 2002). However, for some indi-
viduals (about 15% of frequent gamblers and about 1.6% of the
general population; Wardle et al., 2007; INSERM, 2008), gam-
bling can spiral out of control and become a financial burden on
the individual and his/her family.
Gambling disorder is defined as persistent and recurrent mal-
adaptive gambling behavior characterized by an inability to con-
trol gambling that disrupts personal, family or vocational pursuits
(APA, 2013). More specifically, similar to substance (e.g., alcohol,
cocaine) addictions, pathological gamblers (PG) exhibit a loss of
willpower to resist gambling: they persist in gambling despite the
occurrence of negative consequences (e.g., loss of a significant
relationship, job or career opportunity) (APA, 2013).
Over the last decade, research has focused on the neurocog-
nitive determinants of gambling disorder and found a number
of similarities between drug addiction and gambling addiction
(for a review, see Leeman and Potenza, 2012), suggesting that
gambling addiction shares common mechanisms with substance
addiction. These findings are in line with the new classification
of gambling disorder in the DSM-V (APA, 2013), which views
gambling disorder as a “behavioral addiction” that, unlike sub-
stance abuse, does not involve intake of an exogenous substance.
Hence, given the absence of the confounding effect of chemical
substances that can alter the brain in many non-specific ways,
the study of gambling disorder offers one critical approach to
understand and extract components specifically involved in the
development of addiction.
With respect to the study of impaired decision-making in
addiction, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994) has
been regarded as the most widely used and ecologically valid mea-
sure of decisionmaking in this clinical population. One of the rea-
sons for this ecological validity is that performing advantageously
on this task requires, as in real-life, dealing with uncertainty in
a context of punishment and reward, with some choices being
advantageous in the short-term (high reward), but disadvanta-
geous in the long run (higher punishment); other choices are less
attractive in the short-term (low reward), but advantageous in the
long run (lower punishment). Hence, the key feature of this task is
that participants have to forgo short-term benefits for long-term
benefits, a process that is presumably severely hampered in drug
and gambling addicts (APA, 2013). Accordingly, performance on
the IGT has been shown to be a sensitive measure of impaired
decision-making in a diversity of neurological and psychiatric
conditions (Bechara, 2007). For instance, patients with frontal
www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 665 | 1
Brevers et al. Gambling disorder and IGT
lesions (Bechara et al., 1994, 2000; Manes et al., 2002) and sub-
stance dependent (SD) individuals (Petry et al., 1998; Grant et al.,
2000; Bechara et al., 2001; Whitlow et al., 2004) have demon-
strated a preference for short-term gains despite larger net losses
while performing the IGT. With regard to PG, it also appears
that they display a stubborn preference for disadvantageous deck
selection during the IGT (see Table 1).
But what are the processes underlying this inability to opti-
mally ponder immediate vs. long terms consequences of a choice
(Bechara, 2005)? On the basis of the dual-process model of self-
regulation (e.g., Bechara, 2005; Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Redish
et al., 2008), the ability to decide advantageously according to
short-term and long-term outcomes involves the optimal activa-
tion of two neural systems: (i) an “impulsive,” amygdala-striatum
dependent, neural system that promotes automatic, habitual, and
salient behaviors; and (ii) a prefrontal “reflective” neural sys-
tem that forecasts the future consequences of a behavior and
allows inhibitory control of automatic responses. The “impul-
sive” system is critical for processing the incentive motivational
effects of a variety of natural (e.g., food) and non-natural
rewards (e.g., money), which are mainly processed through an
amygdala-striatal neural system (Robbins et al., 1989; Wise and
Rompre, 1989; Robinson and Berridge, 1993; Di Chiara, 1999).
Importantly, this is also the neural system that has been argued
to be responsible for the transfer of reward seeking from con-
trolled to automatic and habitual behaviors (Everitt et al., 1999;
Everitt and Robbins, 2005). The “reflective” system is necessary
to control basic impulses and allow the more flexible pursuit of
long-term goals. This system includes executive functions (EFs),
which could be understood as a variety of cognitive abilities
that allow the conscious control of thought, emotion and action.
The action of the reflective system depends on the integrity
of two sets of neural systems: a “cool” and a “hot” EFs sys-
tem (Zelazo and Müller, 2002). These “cool” and “hot” EFs are
achieved through relatively slow, controlled processes and allow
to hold on to a mental representation for contemplation and self-
reflection (Smith and DeCoster, 2000). “Cool” EFs are mediated
by lateral inferior and dorsolateral frontostriatal and frontopari-
etal networks and refer to abstract decontextualized reasoning
(Kerr and Zelazo, 2004). More specifically, “cool” executive pro-
cesses include problem-solving abilities that require the capacity
to represent a dilemma, maintain, and organize information in
working memory, strategically plan and execute a response, eval-
uate the efficacy of the solution, and make necessary changes
based on the outcome (e.g., shifting back and forth between
multiple tasks and the ability to deliberately suppress prepo-
tent responses that are no longer relevant) (Zelazo and Müller,
2002). Hence, “cool” EFs is associated with rational and cogni-
tive determinations of risks and benefits associated with options,
and requires the knowledge of the risk/benefit ratio, the abil-
ity to retrieve them from memory, and the ability hold them
in mind while comparing and contrasting them through work-
ing memory processes (Seguin et al., 2007). In contrast, “hot”
EFs refer to one’s ability to monitor the self and the situation
for what are considered to be acceptable social behaviors, regu-
late emotional responses, and inhibit impulsive reactions. These
EFs are mediated by ventromedial (VMPC) and orbito (OFC)
prefrontal cortex structures that are closely connected to the
limbic system, which confers to hot EFs a critical role in regu-
lating affective and motivational processes (Zelazo and Müller,
2002). Hence, by overcoming impulsive triggers, “hot” execu-
tive processing results in the ability to advantageously weigh
short-term gains against long-term losses, that is, to optimally
anticipate the potential outcomes of a given decision (Damasio,
1996). Importantly, several theoretical accounts advance that
before elaborate decontextualized problem-solving abilities and
other related cognitive skills (i.e., “cool” EFs) can begin to be
enacted, the ability to control emotional reactions and inhibit
basic behavioral impulses may be required first (Barkley, 1997;
Sonuga-Barke et al., 2002; Giancola et al., 2012). More specifi-
cally, the ability to control emotional reactions and inhibit basic
behavioral impulses by “hot” EFs would allow rational and cogni-
tive determinations of risks and benefits associated with options
(Giancola et al., 2012). For instance, when exposed to high-
uncertain rewards, individuals with intact “hot” EF capacities will
be capable to control their emotional responses and inhibiting
their impulses directed at the reward, which will then make it
significantly more likely that they will engage in the more cool
abstract reasoning/problem-solving aspects of EF. In turn, the
enactment of those “cool” EFs would reinforce the efficiency of
reward anticipation processes (e.g., to weigh short-term gains
against long-term losses on both emotional and rational bases).
Thus, adequate decision-making reflects an integration of cogni-
tive (i.e., “cool” EFs) and affective (i.e., “hot” EFs) systems, and
the ability to more optimally weigh short term gains against long
term losses or probable outcomes of an action. One important
consequence of this assumption is that, if learning is suddenly
interrupted (e.g., absence of deck selection outcomes during a
IGT “blind” phase, occurring after an standard 100-choice inter-
action with the IGT; Stocco et al., 2009), individuals can still
make their decisions based on representations they have previ-
ously acquired through cognitive and affective processes (e.g.,
Stocco et al., 2009).
In the present review, based on this dual-process model
and on recent influential theoretical accounts (Hofmann and
Friese, 2008; Hofmann et al., 2009; Verdejo-Garcia and Bechara,
2009; Stacy and Wiers, 2010; Noël et al., 2013), we argue
that PGs’ exaggerate the salience associated with gambling
cues to the point that these cues literally “hijack” the cog-
nitive and affective reflective processes necessary to choose
on the basis of both short-term and long-term outcomes.
In other words, the “working hypothesis” here is that the
extreme saliency associated with high short-term rewards in
PG detrimentally impacts their decision-making profile during
the IGT.
GAMBLING DISORDER AND IGT PERFORMANCE
There is a convergence in findings from studies examining
decision-making using the IGT in PG (see also Table 1). More
specifically, abstinent (e.g., Goudriaan et al., 2005) or non-
abstinent (e.g., Power et al., 2012) PG with (e.g., Cavedini
et al., 2002) or without co-morbid substance (e.g., Brevers et al.,
2012a) abuse seem to display a stubborn preference for disad-
vantageous deck selection during the IGT, as compared with
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Table 1 | Studies using the IGT in gambling disorder.
Study Participants SOGS score
(SD)
Cognitive tasks Main results
Brevers et al., 2012a PrG ranging from low
PrG to severe
PG = 65, 50 male
HC = 35, 29 male
DSM diagnose
7.07 (3.74)
IGT
Card Playing Task (CPT)
Cups task
Coin Flipping Task
Operation span working memory
task (OSPAN)
IGT, CPT, Cups task, CFT, OSPAN: PrG <
HC
Problem gambling severity correlates with
performance on the IGT and the CPT
In HC: correlation between later stages of
IGT and OSPAN
In PG: no correlation between later stages
of IGT and OSPAN
Brevers et al., 2013b PG = 30, 29 male
HC = 35, 27 male
DSM diagnose IGT with post-decision wagering IGT: PG < HC
PG whereas HC
HC maximized their wagers on
advantageous decks and minimized their
wagers on disadvantageous decks
PG maximized their wagers independently
of selecting advantageous decks
Cavedini et al., 2002 PG = 20, 19 male
HC = 40, 28 male
DSM diagnose
15.8 (3.6)
IGT
Weigl’s Sorting Test (WST)
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
(WCST)
IGT: PG < HC
WST: PG = HC
WCST: PG = HC
De Wilde et al., 2013 PG = 21, 20 male
HC = 31, 27 male
DSM diagnose
11.14 (4.12)
IGT
Delay Discounting Task (DDT)
Stroop with gambling words
IGT, DDT, Stroop: PG = HC
Stroop: PG < HC
Forbush et al., 2008 PG = 25, 14 male
HC = 34, 9 male
DSM diagnosis IGT
WAIS letter and numbers and
picture
Controlled Oral Word Association
Test (COWAT)
WCST-64
Boston diagnostic aphasia exam
animal naming test (BDAEANT)
Trail Making Task A and B
Stroop, WAIS, WCST, COWAT and
BDAEANT: PG < HC
Stroop IGT: PG < HC
Trail Making Task A and B: PG = HC
Goudriaan et al.,
2005
PG = 48, 41 male
AD = 46, 36 male
TS = 47, 32 male
DSM diagnose
13.9 (6.3)
IGT
Computerized card playing task
GO/NO-GO task with reward and
loss version
IGT: PG < HC; PG = AD
IGT perseveration: PG < HC
Commission errors GO/NO-GO: PG > HC
Goudriaan et al.,
2006
PG = 46, 39 male
HC = 47, 36 male
DSM diagnose
14.4 (6.1)
IGT with skin conductance
response (SCR) and heart rate
(HR) reactivity
IGT: PG < HC
HR decrease before choosing bad deck in
HC < PG
SCR reaction to disadvantageous decks
HC > PG
HR decreases with loss and increases in
wins in HC HR decreases for both wins
and losses in PG
Kertzman et al., 2011 PG = 51, 35 male
HC = 57, 36 male
DSM diagnose
14.4 (6.1)
IGT
Stroop task
Go/NoGo task
IGT: PG < HC
Stroop task, Go/NoGo: PG < HC
No association between Stroop +
Go/NoGO and IGT performance
Lakey et al., 2007 HC = 57, 48 male
PrG = 85, 63 male
PG = 79, 55 male
DIGS
0–2
3–4
>5
IGT
GGT (overconfidence measures)
Overconfidence and bed acceptance on
the GGT and disadvantageous choices on
Problem gambling severity correlates with
performance on the IGT
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Study Participants SOGS score
(SD)
Cognitive tasks Main results
Ledgerwood et al.,
2012
PG = 45, 21 male
HC = 45, 23 male
NODS lifetime
8.0 (1.7)
NODS past year
7.5 (1.8)
IGT
Tower of London
GoStop response inhibition task
Stroop test
COWAT
WCST
IGT: PG < HC
Tower of London: PG < HC
GoStop, Stroop; COWAT, WCST: PG = HC
Linnet et al., 2006 PG = 61, 54 male
HC = 39, 11 male
8.93 (1.86) IGT (Mouse Game version) IGT: PG < HC
Switching behavior after negative
feedback: PG < HC
Linnet et al., 2010 PG = 16, all male
HC = 15, all male
DSM diagnose
13.12 (2.06)
IGT (ABCD, KLMN and QRST
versions) with PET using
[11C]raclopride to measure
dopamine release in the ventral
striatum
PG who lost money (net IGT outcome)
significantly increased dopamine release
in the left ventral striatum compared with
HC
PG and HC who won money did not differ
in dopamine release
Linnet et al., 2011a PG = 16, all male
HC = 14, all male
DSM diagnose
13.19 (2.11)
IGT (ABCD, KLMN and QRST
versions) with PET using
[11C]raclopride to measure
dopamine release in the ventral
striatum
IGT: PG = HC
Dopamine release was associated with
higher IGT performance in HC and
significantly lower IGT performance PG
Linnet et al., 2011b PG = 18, all male
HC = 16, all male
DSM diagnose IGT (ABCD, KLMN and QRST
versions) with PET using
[11C]raclopride to measure
dopamine release in the ventral
striatum
PG with dopamine release in the ventral
striatum had significantly higher
excitement levels than HC despite lower
IGT performance
No differences in excitement levels and
IGT performance were found between PG
and HC without dopamine release
PG showed a significant correlation
between dopamine release and
excitement level, while no such interaction
was found in HC
Linnet et al., 2012 PG = 18, all male
HC = 16, all male
DSM diagnose IGT with PET using [11C]raclopride
to measure dopamine release in
the ventral striatum
High dopamine release in PG in which the
probability of selecting advantageous
decks is maximally uncertain (ratio
advantageous decisions/total decisions =
0.05)
Oberg et al., 2011 PG = 15, all male
HC = 13, all male
NODS
2.8
CPGI
5.4
IGT modified version with EEG IGT: PG < HC
HC < PG MedioFrontal Negativity, 185ms
post-disadvantageous deck outcome
PG < HC P300 Theta Amplitude, 300ms
post-disadvantageous deck outcome
Peterson et al., 2010 PG = 11, all male
HC = 11, all male
DSM diagnose IGT (ABCD, KLMN and QRST
versions) with SCR reactivity and
PET using [11C]raclopride to
measure dopamine release
Active IGT gambling minus passive IGT
gambling: HC < PG in SCR
In both PG and HC, highly
sensation-seeking subjects had significant
increase of receptor availability in striatum,
compared to normally sensation-seeking
subjects
Petry, 2001 SD = 63, all male
PG + SD = 27, all male
HC = 21, all male
DSM diagnose
9.3 (2.8)
IGT PG + SD < SD < HC
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Study Participants SOGS score
(SD)
Cognitive tasks Main results
Power et al., 2012 PG = 13, all male
HC = 13, all male
DSM diagnose
13.00 (4.00)
IGT with fMRI IGT: PG < HC
Bad deck minus bad decks: HC < PG in
the orbitofrontal cortex, caudate nucleus
and the amygdala
Roca et al., 2008 PG = 11
HC = 11
Unknown ratio
male/female
DSM diagnose IGT
GO/NO-GO
Addenbrooke’s cognitive
examination; short screen for
general cognitive functions
IGT: HC > PG
GO/NO-GO: HC < PG
General cognitive functions; word fluency
and memory: HC > PG
In PG: no association between IGT and
other cognitive task
Tanabe et al., 2007 SD = 14, 10 male
SD + PG = 14, 12 male
10.7 (4.4)
0.2 (0.4)
IGT modified version with fMRI IGT: SD = SD + PG = HC
Decision making minus control condition:
OFC, ventral medial dorsal,
ventrolateral/anterior insula, ACC, ventral
striatum, parietal en occipital lobes in all
groups
SD = SD + PG < HC in ventral medial
prefrontal cortex activity
SD < SD + PG = HC in right anterior
prefrontal cortex activity
These studies were selected in the basis of a comprehensive literature search conducted in PUBMED and PsychINFO with key search terms, including: Iowa
gambling task, IGT, decision making, uncertain*, ambig* in combination with the key word gambl*. Cross-references were searched in the selected articles. A total
of 1387 hits were retrieved in PUBMED and PsychINFO using the search terms. Selection criteria for studies were inclusion of the original or adapted version of
the IGT, presence of a gamblers group (ranging from frequent to severe pathological gamblers). After this selection, 28 papers remained, 7 articles were excluded
because no control group was included in the study (n = 1) or it concerned review articles (n = 6). SOGS, South Oaks Gambling Screen; HC, healthy controls; PG,
pathological gamblers; PrG, problem gambler; SD, substance dependent.
healthy control participants. Nevertheless, a couple of stud-
ies reported non-significant difference between PG and con-
trols on the IGT (Tanabe et al., 2007; Linnet et al., 2011a,b,
2012; De Wilde et al., 2013). This finding could be due to
the low sample size of the PG group recruited in these stud-
ies (see Table 1). This absence of significant difference might
also stem from the heterogeneity of gambling addiction (even
if PGs’ preferred gambling was not reported in these studies).
More specifically, the literature dichotomizes gambling activi-
ties into non-strategic (e.g., slot machines games) and strate-
gic (e.g., poker) gambling (e.g., Potenza, 2001; Grant et al.,
2012). Strategic gambling conceivably involves different cogni-
tive demands than non-strategic gambling. Poker, for example,
in addition to involve “hot” emotional self-regulation (bluffing,
regulation of loss-induced frustration; Palomäki et al., 2013),
requires “cool” executive processes such as, working memory and
mental flexibility (e.g., keeping track of cards played to deter-
mine odds of receiving a certain card). Hence, one may infer
that strategic gamblers differ from non-strategic gamblers on
several neuropsychological processes. Grant et al. (2012) have
recently examined this possibility but did not report any differ-
ence between strategic (e.g., poker, sports betting, stock market)
and non-strategic gamblers (e.g., slots, roulette) with regard to
their ability to shift between multiple tasks (i.e., set-shifting) and
to inhibit a prepotent motor response. With regard to the IGT,
Goudriaan et al. (2005) found a difference in decision-making
strategies between slot machine gamblers and casino gamblers
(engaged mainly in strategic card games), with the former per-
forming worse than the latter, and the latter not different from
their controls.
In light of the limited research, further studies are needed
to explore the multiple aspects of “hot” and “cool” EFs in
strategic and non-strategic PG. Moreover, the use of comple-
mentary profile analyses may bring important information with
regard to the multifaceted aspect of the gambling dependence
state. For instance, despite a significant between-group differ-
ence, up to 30% of healthy controls have been reported to
exhibit poor performance on the IGT (Li et al., 2010) and nor-
mal performance has also been observed among PGs (Álvarez-
Moya et al., 2011). In addition, Peterson et al. (2010) observed
that, in both PG and controls, highly sensation-seeking sub-
jects had a significant increase in neural activity in a brain
region that receives dopamine projections, i.e., in the ventral
striatum (a brain area involved in the anticipation of mone-
tary rewards; Knutson et al., 2003) during the IGT. As a whole,
these results support the view that gambling disorder is a mul-
tifaceted psychopathological state and that PG may be clus-
tered into distinct subgroups (e.g., high sensation-seeking PG vs.
low sensation-seeking PG; Peterson et al., 2010) in future IGT
studies.
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HYPERACTIVITY OF IMPULSIVE PROCESSES TOWARD
GAMBLING-RELATED CUES IN PG
The amygdala-striatal “impulsive” system has been argued to
be responsible for the transfer of reward seeking from con-
trolled to automatic and habitual behaviors (Everitt et al., 1999;
Everitt and Robbins, 2005). Those incentive automatic/habitual
behaviors are assumed to emerge from the activation of cer-
tain associative clusters in long-term memory by perceptual (e.g.,
words, images, video) or imagined stimulus input (Strack and
Deutsch, 2004). These associations are created and strength-
ened gradually through classical conditioning processes, that
is, by the learning history of temporal or spatial coactiva-
tion between external stimuli and affective reactions (Hofmann
et al., 2008, 2009). These associative clusters endow the organ-
ism the ability to evaluate and respond to the environment
quickly in accordance with one’s current needs and previous
learning experiences (Hofmann et al., 2008, 2009). When, for
example, the gambler encounters gambling-related cues, the
“gambling cluster” may get reactivated, which will automati-
cally trigger a corresponding impulse, consisting of a positive
incentive value attributed to gambling and a corresponding
behavioral schema to approach it (Stacy and Wiers, 2010). In
other words, repeated and marked “high” throughout the rep-
etition of gambling experiences, learned associations between
gambling-rewards hedonic effects and stimuli in the environ-
ment endow these gambling-related cues with the ability to
directly access the mental representations associated with the
action of gambling and, like gambling itself, make them attractive
(Hofmann et al., 2009). As a result, gambling-related cues may be
flagged as salient and automatically trigger motivation-relevant
associative memories (i.e., implicit association) andmay also grab
the addicts’ attention (i.e., attentional bias) (Stacy and Wiers,
2010).
So far, two studies (Yi and Kanetkar, 2010; Brevers et al.,
2013a) have directly investigated implicit association (i.e., spon-
taneous associations between addiction related cues and affec-
tive, arousal, motivational representation in memory, which
are independent of, or not available to, conscious awareness;
Greenwald and Banaji, 1995) toward gambling-related cues in
PG. More specifically, these studies showed that PG exhibited
positive, but not negative implicit associations toward gambling
cues on the well-known Implicit Association Task (Greenwald
et al., 1998). Several studies have also emphasized the pres-
ence of attentional bias for gambling related stimuli in PG. For
instance, two recent studies (Brevers et al., 2011a,b) found that
PG exhibit attentional bias (i.e., a modified attentional pro-
cessing for addiction-relevant stimuli; Franken, 2003) toward
gambling-related cues at early stage of attentional processing
(e.g., attentional encoding; initial orientation of attention), which
depends essentially on automatic-habit processes (Browning
et al., 2010; Cisler and Koster, 2010). Other evidence for the
presence of attentional bias in problem gambling comes from
Zack and Poulos (2004), who investigated whether gambling-
like drugs could prime the addiction-related implicit cognition
network. More specifically, these authors observed that, during
a rapid reading task in which target words were degraded with
asterisks (e.g., w∗a∗g∗e∗r), a dopamine agonist amphetamine
(dopamine is a neurotransmitter that plays a major role in
reward-driven learning for every type of rewards) heightened
PG readiness to read gambling-related words while concur-
rently slowing reading speed of neutral words (Zack and Poulos,
2004). In addition, Zack and Poulos (2004) showed that the
dopamine agonist enhanced self-reported motivation to gamble
in PG. These results suggest that activation of the mesolim-
bic dopamine system gives rise to an incentive “seeking” state,
which also involves the collateral suppression of alternative
motivations.
Enhanced saliency for gambling-related cues in problem gam-
blers has also been highlighted by functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) research on cue reactivity (Crockford et al.,
2005; Goudriaan et al., 2010; but see Potenza et al., 2003). For
instance, Goudriaan et al. (2010) observed that, while viewing
gambling-related pictures, PG exhibited higher brain activation
than controls in areas involved in the reactivity to emotional
information (i.e., the amygdala; Gallagher and Chiba, 1996), in
the formation of interoceptive representation (the insular cortex;
Craig, 2009), and in the regulation of emotional input (i.e., the
VMPC; Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008). In addition, these authors
observed that subjective ratings of craving in PG correlated posi-
tively with brain activation in the VMPC and in the insular cortex.
These results are important because they suggest that the per-
ception of gambling cues in PG trigger gambling urge, which
encompass brain areas involved in impulsive emotional processes
(the amygdala, the insula), as well as “hot” EFs (i.e., VMPC
activation).
HYPERACTIVE IMPULSIVE PROCESSES AND IMPAIRED IGT
PERFORMANCE IN PG
Findings depicted in the previous section suggest that problem
gambling is underlined by powerful impulsive motivational-habit
machinery directed at gambling-related cues, which could pos-
sibly interfere or “hijack” the top-down reflective mechanisms
necessary for triggering alarming signals about future outcomes.
Therefore, one can assume that similar processes may bias PGs’
decision-making during the IGT toward options featuring high,
short-term rewards.
Findings from brain-imaging studies on the IGT in gam-
bling disorder are in line with this assumption. Indeed, recent
positron emission tomography (PET) studies found that, in
contrast to their comparison controls, disadvantageous perfor-
mance on the IGT was associated with dopaminergic release in
the ventral striatum in PG (Linnet et al., 2010, 2011a). More
specifically, whereas in healthy controls dopamine is released
in response to advantageous deck choices, in PG, disadvanta-
geous deck selections (Linnet et al., 2010, 2011a) and subjec-
tive excitement (Linnet et al., 2011b) are higher in response to
dopamine release. Using fMRI technique, Power et al. (2012) have
observed that, during high-risk choice in the IGT, PG exhib-
ited increased activation in regions encompassing the extended
reward pathway, including brain areas involved in the integra-
tion of emotional and cognitive input (i.e., the orbitofrontal
cortex, OFC; Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008), involved in the
reactivity to emotional information (i.e., the amygdala) and
in short-term reward-based behavioral learning (i.e., caudate
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nucleus; Haruno and Kawato, 2006). However, in another fMRI
study, Tanabe et al. (2007) observed a diminished VMPFC
activation during the IGT in SD individuals and also indi-
viduals who are SD and PG (SDPG). Since these studies did
not focus on pure PG, it is important to caution that the
observed diminished VMPFC activation might not be due
to gambling addiction alone, but rather to repeated inges-
tions of exogenous substance that cause harmful effects in
the brain
A main limitation of these brain-imaging studies (both PET
and fMRI) is that components of decision-making during the
IGT have not been broken down into more specific processes that
allow a better evaluation of the differential brain activation asso-
ciated with different steps of decision-making. More specifically,
it is unclear whether enhanced impulsive processes toward disad-
vantageous deck selection is related to outcome anticipation (i.e.,
when the subject is pondering potential options before making
a decision; Cohen and Ranganath, 2005), outcome expectation
(i.e., the subject has made a decision and waits the outcome; van
Holst et al., 2012) or outcome processing (i.e., the subject receive
a feedback on the chosen option). This issue have been recently
addressed by two fMRI studies which have investigated neural
activation associated with the outcome anticipation (Miedl et al.,
2010) and expectation (vanHolst et al., 2012) phases of gambling-
related decision-making in PG. Specifically, Miedl et al. (2010)
observed that, before taking high-risk decisions in a quasi-realistic
blackjack scenario, PG exhibited enhanced brain responses in
the inferior OFC and in the medial pulvinar nucleus (the pulv-
inar is a relay thalamic nucleus that receives interoceptive input
and in turn projects to the insula, all of which are brain areas
associated with impulsive urges; Sewards and Sewards, 2003),
whereas controls showed a significant signal increase in low-risk
conditions, which might reflect a cue-induced signal increase for
high-risk situations in PG (Miedl et al., 2010).With regard to out-
come expectation, van Holst et al. (2012) showed that, compared
with their controls, PG exhibited higher activity in the ventral
striatum and the OFC during the expectation of gambling-related
outcome.
Altogether, findings from brain-imaging studies suggest that
disadvantageous decision-making during the IGT (or during oth-
ers situations of monetary gambling) in PG may be due to their
hypersensitivity, or exaggerated salience, to immediate and larger
monetary rewards. In other words, in PG, the need to make a
gambling-related choice (i.e., disadvantageous decks during the
IGT) could be so high that it could literally “hijack” the “hot”
reflective resources (evidenced through OFC activation) toward
short-term gratification. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that these
brain-imaging findings are in apparent contradiction with psy-
chophysiological findings from Goudriaan et al. (2006) who
observed lowered skin conductance and heart rate responses asso-
ciated with disadvantageous deck selection in PG, as compared to
controls. Indeed, hyperactivity in the fronto-striatal brain reward
pathway is typically associated with higher autonomic-arousal
responses. For instance, striatal (e.g., Salimpoor et al., 2011)
and VMPC (e.g., Wong et al., 2007) activations have been asso-
ciated with greater heart rate and skin conductance response.
Hence, further studies are needed to implement a careful online
measurement of autonomic arousal during fMRI scanning (for a
review on how integrating fMRI with psychophysiological mea-
surements during the IGT, see Wong et al., 2011), which would
complement fMRI findings in providing a more comprehensive
understanding on the physiological and neural mechanisms of
impaired decision-making in PG. Moreover, additional studies
are needed in order to examine the association between IGT
and other indexes of “hot” executive processes, that is, pro-
cesses involved in the regulation of short-term reward in PG.
One option would be to examine the association between the
IGT and the delay discounting task (DDT; Madden et al., 1997).
In this task, individuals are to choose between smaller imme-
diate rewards and larger, delayed rewards (e.g., $9 immediately
vs. $15 in 1 week). Several studies showed that, as compared
with their controls, PG exhibited a higher intolerance to delayed
gratification on the DDT (e.g., Brevers et al., 2012b). Moreover,
evidence suggests that the OFC play an important role in the
capacity to delay reward on the DDT (e.g., Rogers et al., 1999;
Rahman et al., 2001; Krawczyk, 2002). In addition, Monterosso
et al. (2001) found that performance on the IGT was signif-
icantly correlated with performance on the DDT in a group
of cocaine-dependent individuals. These findings suggest that
the IGT and the DDT tap similar affective decision-making
processes.
Importantly, it appears that there is no association between
impairments in “cool” executive functioning and IGT perfor-
mance in PG (for a review on “cool” EFs impairments in
PG, see Goudriaan et al., 2004; van Holst et al., 2010). Roca
et al. (2008) examined IGT performance and prepotent motor
response inhibition (i.e., the ability to deliberately suppress domi-
nant, automatic responses that are no longer relevant or required)
in 11 PG and 11 controls. These authors showed that PG per-
formed worse than controls on the IGT, and they had a poorer
ability to inhibit prepotent responses as assessed with a GO/NO-
GO task. However, there was no significant correlation between
GO/NO-GO commission errors and overall IGT performance.
More recently, based on some evidence supporting that inhibitory
processes may be more important during the latter half of the
IGT (Noël et al., 2007; see also BOX 1 for a discussion on the
association between “cool” EFs and latter stages of the IGT),
Kertzman et al. (2011) examined the association between IGT and
prepotent motor response inhibition (GO/NO-GO and Stroop
task) as a function of early (trials 1–40) and latter (trials 41–
100) stages of IGT performance. However, as in Roca et al.
(2008), Kertzman et al. (2011) found no significant relationship
between impaired response inhibition in PG and their disad-
vantageous decision-making during the latter stages of the IGT.
According to these authors, the fact that impaired IGT perfor-
mance in PGs was not a direct result of their impaired inhibition
functioning may be an expression of more general executive
functioning deficits (e.g., working memory, cognitive flexibility).
However, this assumption is not congruent with findings from a
recent study by Brevers et al. (2012a) which highlighted that PGs’
impaired performance on dual tasking (a main central executive
components of working memory) was not correlated with their
lowered IGT performance, at either the early or the latter stages
of IGT. These findings suggest that impaired IGT performance
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in PG is independent from their deficit in “cool” executive pro-
cesses. To a broader extent, these results are in line with theoretical
accounts which advance that before elaborate decontextualized
problem-solving abilities and other related cognitive skills can
begin to be enacted, the ability to control emotional reactions
and inhibit basic behavioral impulses is required first (Barkley,
1997; Sonuga-Barke et al., 2002; Giancola et al., 2012). Put dif-
ferently, the “hijack” of impulsive incentive process on the “hot”
reflective resources would hamper further elaborated decontextu-
alized problem-solving abilities (i.e., “cool” executive processes).
Further studies are needed in order to confirm that impaired
“cool” executive processes do not impact PGs’ IGT performance.
One option would be to increase the number of IGT trials (e.g.,
from 100–120) and to examine the association between these later
trials and performance on tasks estimating “cool” EFs. Indeed, the
impact of “cool” is higher during the later trials of the IGT (see
BOX 1). Another option would be to use the IGT with the rever-
sal contingencies condition (Fellows and Farah, 2005). In this task
the initial reward/punishment schedule are rearranged such that
the two disadvantageous decks no longer had an initial advantage
in the opening trials. Hence, if PGs obtain same performances as
those of healthy controls, it would suggest that it is a difficulty
in reversing early learning that is underpinning the behavioral
profile of PG on the IGT (Dunn et al., 2006).
GAMBLING DISORDER AND POST-DECISION APPRAISALS
DURING THE IGT
Throughout this paper, we have seen that PG exhibited poor
deck selection during the IGT. But how do they react to the
consequences of their choice? More specifically, are PG impaired
in their ability to react to loss and reward during the IGT?
Goudriaan et al. (2006) have demonstrated that PGs’ heart rate
decreased after choosing from either the good or bad decks,
whereas the heart rate of their controls decreased after disad-
vantageous choices, but increased after advantageous choices.
These findings indicate that, as compared to controls, PG exhibit
decreased reactivity to rewards and losses during the IGT.
Furthermore, in another study, Goudriaan et al. (2005) observed
that, compared to controls, PG displayed a higher response speed
and lower response shifting after rewards and net losses. Taken
together, findings from Goudriaan et al. (2005, 2006) are consis-
tent with several brain imaging studies that observed a reduction
of cerebral activity for the processing of rewards and losses in PG
during monetary gambling task (Reuter et al., 2005; de Ruiter
et al., 2009). Nevertheless, Oberg et al. (2011) have recently
observed that disadvantageous IGT deck selection in PGwas asso-
ciated with a hypersensitive neural response at a very early (i.e.,
185ms) post-feedback latency (i.e., the MedioFrontal Negativity,
which is involved in the early, rapid positive vs. negative appraisal
of feedback; Yeung et al., 2004), but lower neural activity at a later
phase (i.e., 300ms) of feedback processing (i.e., the P300 Theta
Amplitude which reflects a later, attention-sensitive, more elabo-
rated appraisal of outcome evaluation; Sato et al., 2005). Hence,
these results indicate that, although PG may exhibit a blunted
absolute response to outcome signals in general, the neurobiol-
ogy of feedback processing in problem gambling is probably more
complex. Noteworthy, mean age of PG participants recruited by
Oberg et al. (2011) was 23 and their scores of problem gambling
Box 1 | The impact of “cool” EFs during the IGT
The IGT has been shown to tap into “hot” EFs, that is,
aspects of decision-making that are influenced by affect and
emotion (Bechara, 2004). Specifically, Bechara and colleagues
have demonstrated that, whereas healthy controls learn to avoid
the disadvantageous decks, patients with damage to VMPFC
continue to choose from these disadvantageous decks (e.g.,
Bechara et al., 1994, 1997, 2000). Nevertheless, several recent
findings suggest that not all aspects of the IGT are equal at
detecting “hot” decision-making processes. Consistent with
this view, performances on working memory (Brevers et al.,
2012a), dominant response inhibition (Noël et al., 2007) and cog-
nitive flexibility (Brand et al., 2007; Iudicello et al., 2013) have
been associated with performance of healthy controls on the lat-
ter stages of the IGT. Hence, these results suggest that “cool”
executive processes may be involved in the latter trials of the IGT.
One explanation for these findings is that, across trials, the
IGT may vary according to its level of uncertainty (Brand et al.,
2006). More specifically, selections during the last block of trials
may be referred as decision-making under risk (i.e., situations
of decision-making in which probabilities of reward and loss are
known) because participants should have experienced the dif-
ferent win/loss contingencies enough to know which decks are
risky and which are not. By contrast, because there has not been
time for a participant to experience any of the win/loss contin-
gencies during early deck choices, the first blocks of the IGT refer
to decision-making under ambiguity (i.e., situations of decision-
making in which probabilities of reward and loss are unknown).
Several theoretical accounts advance that processes underly-
ing decision-making may depend upon the degree of uncertainty
and the amount of information offered to the decision-maker
(e.g., Brand et al., 2006; Krain et al., 2006). More specifically,
because it does not offers explicit rules for possible outcomes or
probabilities, decision-making under ambiguity has to be made
via the reactivation of emotions associated with similar previous
experiences (i.e., “hot” executive processes; Brand et al., 2006;
Krain et al., 2006). By contrast, decision-making a decision under
risk, which offers explicit rules for reinforcement and punish-
ment, would involve both the integration of pre-choice emotional
processes and rational analytical system aspects (i.e., “cool”
executive processing; Brand et al., 2006; Krain et al., 2006).
In other words, deteriorations in “hot” and “cool” executive
functions could alter differently decision-making under risk and
decision-making under ambiguity. For instance,Brandet al. (2007)
observed that individuals with lowered “cool” executive func-
tioning (i.e., concept formation, shifting between multiple tasks,
and dominant response inhibition) butwith intact “hot” executive
processing (i.e., pre-choice emotional activation reactivity associ-
atedwith an advantageous decision-making profile) exhibited less
disadvantageous choices in situations of decision-making under
ambiguity as compared with situations of decision-making under
risk.Bycontrast,Brandetal. (2007) also found that individualswith
selective deficits in pre-choice emotional activation butwith intact
“cool” executive functioning exhibited disadvantageous choices
in decision-making under risk and under ambiguity. Additional
studies have shown that advantageous decision-making under
risk, but not under ambiguity, is associated with efficient “cool”
executive processing (i.e., calculative strategies; Brand, 2008;
Brand et al., 2009). Moreover, advantageous decision-making
under risk (Starcke et al., 2011), but not under ambiguity (Turnbull
et al., 2005), is lowered when subjects have to take a decision
while concurrently performing a secondary task (i.e., random
number generation), which are known to load “cool” executive
resources (Baddeley and Della Sala, 1996).
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severity were relatively low. Hence, in Oberg et al. (2011), PGs’
hypersensitivity to reward at early post-feedback latency might
be due to the fact that they were at an early-stage of prob-
lem gambling and had not yet suffered the long-term conse-
quences of excessive gambling (e.g., tolerance to money reward).
Further longitudinal investigations would be helpful in evalu-
ating the potential use of Oberg et al. (2011) findings as an
early indicator of predisposition to gambling or other addictive
behaviors.
As a whole, these results indicate that, throughout the repeti-
tion of gambling behaviors, PG acquire an extensive experience
in making complex financial decisions involving variable wins,
losses and probabilities. Thus, while gambling disorder does not
entail exogenous drug administration, neural systems that pro-
cess rewards may nonetheless undergo neuroadaptive change as
the gambler experiences a chronic regime of winning and los-
ing, coupled with the changes in arousal that are induced by those
events. Because of this tolerance, problem gamblers may start to
act out more frequently and, sometimes, in more dangerous ways
by often gambling with greater and greater stakes toward options
featuring high but uncertain rewards.
Are PG also impaired in their ability to assess the quality of
their already poor decisions? In other words, is there a disso-
ciation between PGs’ subjective evaluation of IGT performance
and their actual performance (i.e., metacognitive ability)? Such
impairment of metacognitive capacity in individuals suffering
from addiction may be reflected in one of the most common
observation from the clinic of addiction, that is, impairment
in recognition of the severity of the disorder by the addict
(i.e., lack of insight; Goldstein et al., 2009). For instance, only
4.5% of the 21.1 million persons classified as needing (but not
receiving) substance use treatment reported a perceived need
for therapy (SAMHSA, 2007). Hence, when metacognitive judg-
ment becomes exceedingly disrupted, the repetition of addiction-
related behaviors may be heightened by the underestimation of
addiction severity.
Metacognitive judgment during the IGT has been recently
examined in PG by Brevers et al. (2013b). These authors exam-
ined metacognitive capacities in PG by asking participants to
wager on their own decisions after each choice during the IGT
(i.e., IGT with post-decision wagering; Persaud et al., 2007).
These authors observed that, unlike controls, PG participants
tend to wager high while performing poorly on the IGT. This
result suggests that PG exhibited impairments not only in their
ability to correctly assess risk in situations that involve ambigu-
ity, but also in their ability to correctly express metacognitive
judgments about their own performance. That is, PG not only
perform poorly, but they also erroneously estimate that their per-
formance is much better than it actually is. In line with these
findings, Goudriaan et al. (2005) showed that PG exhibited lower
IGT conceptual knowledge than their controls when they were
asked to indicate which decks were advantageous or disadvanta-
geous. Interestingly, in another recent study, Brevers et al. (2013c)
showed that PG were also impaired in their capacity to evaluate
accurately the quality of their decisions during a non-gambling
task in which the quality of choice remains uncertain through-
out the task (i.e., an artificial grammar-learning paradigm). After
each trial of this task, participants had to indicate how confident
they were in their grammaticality judgments. Results showed that,
by contrast with their controls, there was no correlation between
PGs’ grammaticality judgments and their level of confidence,
which suggests a disconnection between performance and confi-
dence in PG. To a broader extent, these findings indicate that PG
are impaired in their metacognitive abilities on a non-gambling
task, which suggests that gambling disorder is associated with
poor insight as a general factor.
Future studies are needed to confirm this assumption. The
use of functional neuroimaging studies, which could probe the
neural basis of these deficits, is one option. Indeed, a recent
investigation showed that the prefrontal cortex, and especially
areas involved in “cool” EFs, such as the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex, are activated while subjects report metacognitive
judgment on their performance during “neutral” situations of
decision-making. For instance, Del Cul et al. (2009) have demon-
strated that prefrontal lesions could affect subjective reports of
visual experience more than visual task performance. Moreover,
Slachevsky et al. (2001, 2003) have shown that lesion affect-
ing the prefrontal cortex also affects awareness as well as the
monitoring of actions or sensory-motor readjustments. Other
studies showed that bilaterally-depressed activity in the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex, through transcranial magnetic stimulation,
can affect metacognition but not task performance during a
visual discrimination task (Turatto et al., 2004; Rounis et al.,
2010).
SUMMARY
PG display a stubborn preference for disadvantageous deck selec-
tion throughout the IGT, which suggest that they are hampered
in their ability to resist short-term high and uncertain rewards.
In this paper, based on dual-process model of willpower (e.g.,
Bechara, 2005; Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Redish et al., 2008), and
on recent influential theoretical accounts (Hofmann et al., 2008,
2009; Verdejo-Garcia and Bechara, 2009; Stacy and Wiers, 2010;
Noël et al., 2013), we advanced the view that this inability to forgo
short-term benefits for long-term benefits may be underlined by
an exaggerated response to cues predicting immediate and large
monetary rewards (see Figure 1 for a framework summarizing
processes underlying A. advantageous deck selection in healthy
controls and B. disadvantageous deck selection in pathological
gamblers).
We first reviewed findings showing that gambling-related cues
automatically trigger PGs’ motivation-relevant associative mem-
ories (Yi and Kanetkar, 2010; Brevers et al., 2013a) and grab
the addicts’ attention (e.g., Brevers et al., 2011a,b). In addi-
tion, findings from cue reactivity studies suggest that scores of
subjective craving correlated positively with PGs’ brain activa-
tion in areas involved in impulsive/automatic emotional pro-
cesses (i.e., the amygdala, the insula) but also in “hot” EFs (i.e.,
the VMPC) (Crockford et al., 2005; Goudriaan et al., 2010).
These results suggest that gambling disorder is underlined by
powerful impulsive motivational-habit machinery directed at
gambling-related cues, which could possibly bias PGs’ decision-
making during the IGT toward option featuring high, short-term
rewards.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) A framework for advantageous deck selection in healthy
controls. Pathway (a): Impulsive motivational processes directed at options
featuring short-term salient rewards. Pathway (b): The moderation of
impulsive processes by “hot” reflective processes involved in the reduction
of impulsive-incentive reactions and in the ability to anticipate the potential
outcomes of a given decision on an emotional basis. Pathway (c): The ability
to control emotional reactions and inhibit basic behavioral impulses by “hot”
executive/reflective functions allows rational and cognitive determinations of
risks and benefits associated with options (only during the last trials of the
IGT, that is, when participants have experienced the different winl/loss
contingencies enough and become aware of which decks are more at risk
than others), which further reinforce the efficiency of reward anticipation
processes (e.g., to weigh short-term gains against long-term losses on both
emotional and rational bases). Pathway (d): Adequate sensitivity to loss and
reward and accurate assessment of the quality of the decision, which would
bias advantageously forthcoming deck selections. (B) A framework for
disadvantageous deck selection in pathological gamblers. Pathway (a):
Hyperactive impulsive motivational processes directed at options featuring
high, short-term rewards (as evidenced with attentional bias and implicit
association toward gambling-related cues in PG; see Hyperactivity of
impulsive processes toward gambling-related cues in PG). These impulsive
processes could possibly interfere with or “hijack” the top-down “hot”
reflective mechanisms necessary for triggering alarming signals about futures
outcomes (as evidenced by fMRI studies which showed that, during
disadvantageous lGT choice or during gambling·-related choice, PG exhibit
increased activation in brain regions encompassing both impulsive-amygdala,
ventral striatum, caudate nucleus, medial pulvinar nucleus - and “hot”
reflective·- orbitofrontal cortex - processes; see Hyperactive impulsive
processes and impaired IGT performance in PG). As a result,
disadvantageous deck options may be flagged as salient and preferred to
advantageous decks. Pathway (b): The “hijack” by impulsive incentive
processes of the “hot” reflective resources would hamper further elaborated
decontextualized problem-solving abilities (suggested by the absence of
correlation between PGs’ impairments in “cool” executive functioning and
their lowered IGT performances, at either the early or the latter stages of IGT;
see Hyperactive impulsive processes and impaired IGT performance in PG).
Pathway (c): Hyposensitivity to loss and reward in PG (as evidenced by fMRI
studies which observed a diminished ventral striatal response in PG after
receiving monetary rewards and losses; see Gambling disorder and
post-decision appraisals during the IGT) and failure at correctly assessing the
quality of their already poor decision (evidenced by studies which observed a
dissociation between PGs’ subjective assessment of performance and
objective performance; see Gambling disorder and post-decision appraisals
during the IGT). As a result, PG might fail at properly integrate the outcomes
of their actions over time, which could lead them to persist in taking high-risk
choices, despite suffering large losses.
Accordingly, we then focused on studies investigating pro-
cesses involved in PGs’ impaired IGT performance. PET studies
highlighted that disadvantageous performance on the IGT was
associated with dopaminergic release in the ventral striatum in
PG (Linnet et al., 2010, 2011a,b, 2012). Moreover, fMRI findings
(Power et al., 2012) observed that, in line with cue-reactivity stud-
ies (e.g., Goudriaan et al., 2010), high-risk choice during the IGT
in PG was underlined by an increased neural activation in regions
involved in the reactivity to emotional information (i.e., the
amygdala), in short-term reward-based behavioral learning (i.e.,
the caudate nucleus), and in the integration of emotional and
cognitive input (i.e., the OFC). In other words, these results sug-
gest that the incentive-salience associated with gambling-related
choice (i.e., disadvantageous decks selection during the IGT) in
PG is so high that it could literally “hijack” the “hot” reflective
resources toward short-term gratifications. In addition, it appears
that PGs’ impairments in “cool” executive processes, including
working memory (Brevers et al., 2012a) and response inhibition
(Roca et al., 2008; Kertzman et al., 2011), are not associated with
their disadvantageous decks selection, at both early (e.g., trials 1–
40) or late (e.g., trials 41–100) stages of IGT performance. These
findings suggest that PGs’ impaired IGT performances are not
due to their lower level of “cool” EFs.
In the last part of this paper, we highlighted the issue that
gambling disorder might also be associated with a diminished
feedback reactivity during the IGT. In addition, recent findings
suggest that PG not only perform poorly on the IGT, but they also
erroneously estimate that their performance is much better than
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it actually is (Brevers et al., 2013b). These findings on feedback
reactivity and metacognitive capacity imply that PG might fail at
properly integrating the outcomes of their actions over time in
order to form a global impression of the trade-offs between risk
and reward, which could lead them to persist in taking high-risk
choices, despite suffering large losses.
FUTURE STUDIES
As suggested throughout this paper, additional studies are needed
in order to further examine the processes associated with
impaired IGT performance in PG. For instance, future studies
should examine the association between IGT and other tasks
estimating “hot” executive processes, such as the delayed dis-
counting task (e.g., Hongwanishkul et al., 2005). Moreover, addi-
tional fMRI studies are also needed in order to better evaluate
differential brain activation as it relates to different phases of
decision-making during the IGT (i.e., outcome anticipation, out-
come expectation, and outcome processing). It should also be
useful to implement a careful online measurement of autonomic
arousal during the fMRI scanning, which would complement
fMRI findings in providing a more comprehensive understanding
on the physiological and neural mechanisms underlying impaired
decision-making in PG (e.g., Wong et al., 2011). Further studies
are also needed in order to confirm that impaired “cool” exec-
utive processes do not impact PGs’ IGT performance, by using
for instance, the IGT with the reversal contingencies condition
(Fellows and Farah, 2005) or by increasing the number of IGT
trials (because the impact of “cool” is higher during the later
trials of the IGT). Finally, future studies should also assess pre-
and post-IGT gambling-related craving in PG. Indeed, recent
theoretical accounts argue that the subjective experience of urge
and cravingmay increase the drive andmotivation to gamble (and
to choose decks featuring high reward but higher losses during
the IGT) in PG by sensitizing or exacerbating the activity of the
habit/impulsive system, and by subverting attention, reasoning,
planning, and decision-making processes to seek and access gam-
bling (Verdejo-Garcia and Bechara, 2009; Sutherland et al., 2012;
Noël et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, because it mimics both real life and gambling-
related decision-making situations, the IGT may be the most
ecologically valid estimation of decision-making impairments in
PG. Accordingly, through the use of this task, studies on gam-
bling addiction have yielded a consistent view of disadvantageous
decision-making in PG. In this review, we advanced that this aber-
rant profile of decision-making may be underlined by a hyper-
activity of impulsive processes toward high-uncertain rewards,
which can interfere with “hot” and “cool” reflective resources nec-
essary for self-regulation. Nevertheless, much as to be done as it
remains unclear on how these processes contribute specifically to
the aberrant choice profile displayed by PG on the IGT.
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